The Commodification of Trademarks: Some Final Thoughts on Trademark Dilution by Port, Kenneth L.
Masthead Logo
Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Mitchell Hamline Open Access
Faculty Scholarship
2017
The Commodification of Trademarks: Some Final
Thoughts on Trademark Dilution
Kenneth L. Port
Mitchell Hamline School of Law, ken.port@mitchellhamline.edu
Publication Information
46 Hofstra Law Review 669 (2017)
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Mitchell Hamline
Open Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by
an authorized administrator of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more
information, please contact sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
Footer Logo
Repository Citation
Port, Kenneth L., "The Commodification of Trademarks: Some Final Thoughts on Trademark Dilution" (2017). Faculty Scholarship.
458.
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/458
The Commodification of Trademarks: Some Final Thoughts on
Trademark Dilution
Abstract
This article is an explication of the trend toward commodification of famous or putatively famous trademarks
and the resultant urging that the FTDA be repealed. This article starts with a literature review showing that the
vast majority of commentators have been severely critical of the FTDA. This has been ignored by Congress.
The article next pursues Congress's blind support of the FTDA and suggests that more thought and analysis
from Congress is still required. The article next explains the data regarding FTDA claims. All reported cases
from 1996 through 2015 are coded and examined. The conclusion, looking at the data, is that the FTDA cause
of action is going away. It has been rarely used in enforcement actions, it is much less likely to be successful
than other trademark litigation, and the downward trend of enforcement continues. Finally, the article
considers commodification of trademarks and how we are all negatively impacted by it.
Keywords
Trademarks, Trademark dilution, Commodification, Federal Trademark Dilution Act, Lanham Act
Disciplines
Intellectual Property Law
This article is available at Mitchell Hamline Open Access: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/458
THE COMMODIFICATION OF TRADEMARKS:




The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ("FTDA")' has not
been the panacea for famous marks it was intended to be and has created
perverse unintended consequences. Academics (including myself) have
pointed out for years that the FTDA is unconstitutional2 as it creates
rights under the Lanham Act3 instead of codifying the common law, the
express purpose of the Lanham Act.4 In addition, Congress may regulate
trademark law in the United States by relying on the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution.5 However, as the FTDA allows for the
protection of trademarks distinct from the commerce on which they are
used, dilution is arguably unconstitutional.
The best way to make sense of the FTDA is to concede that the
Lanham Act's FTDA provisions create a property right in a famous
trademark.6 United States trademark jurisprudence generally does not
* Professor of Law and Director, Intellectual Property Institute, William Mitchell College of
Law. I thank Anna Harper, J.D. Candidate, 2018 for her expert research assistance.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (2000)), amended
by Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1063, 1064, 1092, 1125, 1127 (2006)).
2. See, e.g., Kristan Friday, Does Dilution Make Trademarks into Unconstitutional Patents?,
12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 180, 183 (2001): Brian A. Jacobs, Trademark Dilution on the
Constitutional Edge, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 173-75 (2004); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark
Dilution: The Whittling away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV.
789, 841 (1997).
3. Lanham (Trademark) Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat, 427 (1946) (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
4. See Robert C. Denicola, Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Federal Trademark
Legislation and the Trademark Dilution Act of"1995, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1996, at 75,
79-80.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6. See Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion o'American Trademark Law. A Civil
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recognize the trademark as subject to property ownership.7 In addition,
this property right in famous marks subject to the FTDA is considered
absolute even though property rights have never been absolute in the
United States.8 Furthermore, the trademark itself has never been subject
to property ownership. The trademark right lacks incidents of ownership
to make it subject to property ownership.9 As such, when the FTDA
allows property ownership in a mark, it is inconsistent with all prior
common law on the topic. Therefore, courts have struggled mightily to
apply the FTDA in a sane and rational manner."0
Reported litigation involving the FTDA in the United States has all
but ceased."1 Reported cases demonstrate that the FTDA is not a popular
cause of action. When the FTDA was enacted, we were told that there
was a huge harm going unrectified in the trademark world.12 We were
Law Sistem in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 875-76 (2000).
7. See, e.g., Viacom Inc. v. Ingrain Enters., 141 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
to grant plaintiffs dilution claim would constitute a monopoly on the use of language in
commerce); Mister Donut of Am., Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838, 842 (9th Cir. 1969) ("The
law is well settled that there are no rights in a trademark alone ....")" see also Kenneth L. Port, The
IllegitinaO, ofTrademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REV. 519, 552-68 (1993).
8. See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) ("There is
no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant o an established business or
trade in connection with which the mark is employed."); ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc.. 482 F.3d 135,
146-47 (2d Cir. 2007); Electro Source, LLC v. Brandess-Kalt-Aetna Grp., Inc., 458 F.3d 931, 939
n.7 (9th Cir. 2006); Mid-List Press v. Nora, 374 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722. 730 (2002) ("The monopoly is a property
right; and like any property right, its boundaries should be clear."); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533
U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (finding the right to improve property is subject to the exercise of reasonable
state authority); Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598, 609 (1970) (finding that property rights in
govemment allotments are not absolute); United States v. Taylor, 8 F.3d 1074, 1077 (6th Cir. 1993)
(finding the right to refuse entry to land is not absolute); In re Farmers Mkts., Inc., 792 F.2d 1400,
1403 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Property rights are not absolute."); United States v. 16.92 Acres of Land, 670
F.2d 1369, 1373 (7th Cir. 1982) ("It is axiomatic that property rights are not absolute ...."); Ill.
Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 574 F.2d 374, 379 (7th Cir. 1978) ("[P]roperty rights are
not absolute .... "); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 372-73
(1999) (pointing out that trademark expansion from deception-based to property-based trademark
paradigm "presents a serious threat to social welfare").
9. See Port, supra note 6, at 552-68.
10. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,
1030-31 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that the appropriate population for finding similarity is the reified
television announcer but the appropriate population to find fame is society at large); see also ANNE
GILSON LALONDE ET AL., 2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS: TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE
5A-42 (2006) ("[J]udges dislike dilution law and construe it as narrowly as possible.").
11. See infia notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
12. The Committee on the Judiciaiy reported:
The concept of dilution recognizes the substantial investment the owner has made in the
mark and the commercial value and aura of the mark itself, protecting both from those
who would appropriate the mark for their own gain.
A federal dilution statute is necessary because famous marks ordinarily are used on
a nationwide basis and dilution protection is currently only available on a patch-quilt
[Vol. 46:669
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told that the dilution of trademarks would result in "a cancer-like growth
of dissimilar products or services which feeds upon the business
reputation of an established distinctive trade-mark or name."' We were
told that there was a fearsome "gap" in trademark protection and unless
we protected famous marks from dilution, the trademark house of cards
would implode.'4 However, as there are, today, very few cases reported
that rely exclusively on the FTDA, 15 it is safe to say that this so-called
harm never materialized or, if it exists, has not been deemed important
enough to be manifested in reported cases.
Perhaps the best critique and explanation of some of the early
conundrums regarding dilution was supplied by Judge Matthew J. Jasen
in the Allied Maintenance Corp. case as follows:
Generally, courts which have had the opportunity to interpret an
anti-dilution statute have refused to apply its provisions literally. New
York courts, State and Federal, have read into the statute a requirement
of some showing of confusion, fraud or deception.
Judicial hesitance to enforce the literal terms of the anti-dilution
statute has not been limited to New York. In Illinois, for example.
some courts have gone so far as to declare the statute inapplicable
where the parties are competitors and a likelihood of confusion does
exist. These decisions were premised upon the belief that a plaintiff
who can frame his complaint under a theory of infringement or unfair
competition-albeit unsuccessfully perhaps-should not succeed
under a dilution theory. However, one court in Illinois has interpreted
the anti-dilution statute literally, reasoning that unless recovery for
dilution is permitted in the absence of competition or confusion the
statute adds nothing to existing law. 16
One could presume that the FTDA has been a net positive for
trademark plaintiffs' attorneys because it provides another basis on
which to sue, file claims, and counsel clients.'7 However, as the
parameters of "fame" (required under the FTDA) are so nebulous,'" it
system of protection, in that only approximately 25 states have laws that prohibit
trademark dilution.
H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995).
13. Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades. Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162. 1165 (N.Y. 1977).
14. Schechter, in his tamous article, argued that "the gradual whittling away or dispersion of
the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing
goods" was not addressed by the Lanham Act, and would lead to Rolls-Royce radios, Kodak
bicycles, and Beech-Nut cigarettes. Frank i. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark
Proection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813. 825 (1927).
15. See in/t notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
16. 1lied Afinf Co3., 369 N.E.2d at 1165 (citations omitted).
17. See infio note 135 and accompanying text.
18. Congress left the final definition of fTame" up to the courts, when it included a non-
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has, in fact, created much uncertainty about the scope of any
trademark.'9 Truly famous and not famous marks alike claim to be
famous for purposes of the FTDA. The uncertainty regarding fame
detracts from the predictability of any trademark cause of action and,
therefore, actually detracts from a rational litigant's desire to incur the
cost of trademark dilution litigation and file suit. Perhaps this is why
there is almost no reported litigation regarding the FTDA today.20
This uncertainty has encouraged trademark holders2' to engage in
speculation (also known as trademark extortion or trademark bullying).22
Trademark holders feel compelled to make spurious claims that their
marks are famous and therefore a justifiable cause of action under the
FTDA. 2' The FTDA has encouraged trademark holders to see their
trademark rights as a mere commodity, the value of which can be
enhanced to the extent that people acquiesce to spurious claims of fame
or spurious claims that are perceived as leading to fame of their
trademark.4 It is a good and appropriate thing that trademark holders
have come to view their trademarks as an asset.25 However, when the
exclusive list of factors in the FTDA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012). The courts have moved
from using factors that widen the definition of fame (regional fame, niche markets) to those that
make fame harder to establish. See Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029. 1071-72
(2006).
19. See David J. Franklyn. Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theori o/ the
Anti-Free-Rider Principle in Amierican Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117, 129-31 (2004).
20. See ini'a notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
21. Rather than "owners." I refer to the entity who claims a trademark to be the "holder" of
the mark. 'Owner" contributes to the unjustifiable rhetoric that a trademark is subject to property
ownership when it is not. The right to exclude others from using the same or similar mark on the
same or similar products is a property right; however, the mark itself is never subject to property
ownership. Dilution, of course, changes this calculus. Dilution subjects the mark to near absolute
ownership; however, as this so-called ownership was never contemplated by the Commerce Clause
or the Lanham Act, I prefer using the appropriate term to describe what a trademark claimant does:
holding rather than owning.
22. Trademark extortion or bullying is the practice of "a trademark holder assert[ing] a non-
famous mark against a non-competing entity [or entities] on or in connection with goods or services
into which the plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of expanding." Kenneth L. Port, Tradenark
Extortion Revisited. A Response to Vogel and Schachter, 14 CHt.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 217, 221
(2014).
23. See id at 226-32. The rate of summary judgment for defendants in trademark cases rose to
5.5% of cases in 2009. Id. at 226 & tbl. I.
24. Borghese Trademarks Inc. v. Borghese, No. 10 CIV. 5552(JPO)(AJP), 2013 WL 143807.
at *14-16 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2013) (bringing cause of action against members of the Borghese
family claiming, in part, that use of their actual name on noncompeting goods amounted to
trademark infringement).
25. Perhaps the most extreme expression of this is a book titled The PhYsics of Brand:
Undeistand the Forces Behind Brands that Matter. AARON KELLER ET AL., THE PHYSICS OF
BRAND: UNDERSTAND THE FORCES BEHIND BRANDS THAT MATTER (2016). The authors of this
book have skillfully expressed the idea of brand management as if it were a science. In order to
develop a mark that "matters" (according to the authors), one apparently follows the scientific steps
[Vol. 46:669
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source identifying function of a trademark has no rational relationship to
whether a trademark is asserted against a third party, the balance
between using the trademark as a source identifier and the mere
enforcement of trademark for perceived financial gain leads to the
commodification of trademarks. This is not what the United States
Constitution, the Lanham Act, or the common law upon which it is
based, allows.26
The commodification of trademarks has led American trademark
holders away from seeing the mark as an indicator of source and into
seeing the trademark exclusively as a commodity upon which returns
can be recognized. The conceptual challenge here is that the FTDA
encourages trademark holders to see their trademark as a commodity to
be bought and sold like any other commodity and encourages them to
forget the first principle in trademark jurisprudence: the mark is first an
indicia of source27 and is nothing when used other than appurtenant to
the goodwill associated with that mark.2' As a commodity, trademark
that the authors proscribe. Id. at 12-16,13 fig. 1.l, 14 fig. 1.2,15 fig. l.3.
26. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson properly saw that the rights of a trademark should
tall under the Commerce Clause. See Thomas Jefferson, Re)ort on the Polici" of'Securing Porticu/r
Marks to Manfaicturers, 1 ' Law, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 156, 157 (Andrew A.
Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905) (stating that Jefferson limited any trademark law to
"commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,"
tracking the Commerce Clause verbatim); Kenneth L. Port, Titdenark Extortion. The Enl of
Tradeniark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 585, 593 (2008). His wisdom was not realized until after
the failure of trademark law to take hold under the copyright and patent provision. See Port, supra at
593-96. The Lanham Act was enacted to selectively codify the common law in order to provide
consistent protection of a trademark on a national scale, according to the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the congressional record:
Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946 in order to provide national protection for
trademarks used in interstate and foreign commerce .... Previous federal legislation,
such as the Federal Trademark Act of 1905 ... reflected the view that protection of
trademarks was a matter of state concern and that the right to a mark depended solely on
the common law .... Consequently, rights to trademarks were uncertain and subject to
variation in different parts of the country. Because trademarks desirably promote
competition and the maintenance of product quality, Congress determined that "a sound
public policy requires that trademarks should receive nationally the greatest protection
that can be given them."
Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985) (first citing S. REP. No. 79-
1333, at 5 (1946); and then quoting id. at 6).
27. See Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617, 620 (1879) (finding that "the primary object of a
trade-mark is to indicate by its meaning or association the origin of the article to which it is affixed"
and that such trademark cannot be the subject of a sale, separate from the sale of a business); see
also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 786 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating that common law presumed a trademark was the indicator of source): Iti re Tam, 808 F.3d
1321, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding a trademark identifies the source of the goods and its purpose
is to identify said source), cert. grtntedl sub nora. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016), qff"d sub niom.
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
28. See in/ra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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holders perceive a gain by speculating on the underlying value of the
trademark devoid of its functioning to identify source.29 This leads us far
afield from the original intent of congressional protection of trademarks.
This Article is an explication of the trend toward commodification
of famous or putatively famous trademarks and the resultant urging that
the FTDA be repealed. This Article starts with a literature review
showing that the vast majority of commentators have been severely
critical of the FTDA.3" This has been ignored by Congress. The Article
next pursues Congress's blind support of the FTDA and suggests that
more thought and analysis from Congress is still required.3 ' The Article
next explains the data regarding FTDA claims. 2 All reported cases from
1996 through 2015 are coded and examined.3 3 The conclusion, looking
at the data, is that the FTDA cause of action is going away.34 It has been
rarely used in enforcement actions, it is much less likely to be successful
than other trademark litigation, and the downward trend of enforcement
continues. Finally, the Article considers commodification of trademarks
and how we are all negatively impacted by it.
35
II. No TRADEMARK RIGHTS [N GROSS
Historically, trademark rights have not been an in gross right in the
United States.36 Since 1996, trademark dilution rights under the FTDA
have been granted in gross.37 This may be the precise reason why there
29. Of course, as a commodity, the trademark has been valued in other contexts such as for
purposes of the Securities and Exchange Commission, etc. However, these purposes are external
from trademark jurisprudence. Also, although there is nothing normatively wrong with the
commodification of trademarks, if we are to commodify trademarks within trademark jurisprudence,
it ought to be done intentionally not as an unintended after effect to the FTDA.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See infra Part V.
33. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
34. This is inconsistent with 1NTA's predictions that we would see more cases involving
dilution. See Marie Driscoll, INTA and United States Courts, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 128, 133 (2003).
35. See infra Part VI.
36. See Beanstalk Grp., Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[A]
trademark is an identifier, not a freestanding piece of intellectual property; hence the rule that a
trademark cannot be sold in gross, that is, without the assets that create the product that it
identifies."); Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984) ("A trade name or mark is merely
a symbol of goodwill; it has no independent significance apart from the goodwill it symbolizes.").
37. 15 U.S.C. § I 125(c)(1) states:
Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive,
inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against
another person who, at any time after the owner's mark has become famous, commences
use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or
dilution by tamishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of
actual or likely confusion, of competition, or oJactual economic injury.
674 [Vol. 46:669
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is a judicial reticence to apply the FTDA as it seems to be intended in
any given case.38 That is, courts apparently do not believe the statute as
written and struggle mightily to apply some brakes.
When considering the FTDA and famous marks under it and all
other trademarks under the regular provisions of the Lanham Act, it is
significant to keep this distinction in mind. The FTDA is a departure
from 200-plus years of common law trademark protection in the United
States."9 The confusion over the FTDA is only heightened by the fact
that the Lanham Act is an act that codifies the common law, it does not
grant new rights.4" If the Lanham Act granted new rights, the argument
went in 1947 when it was adopted, it would be unconstitutional.41 It is
hard to imagine the FTDA as anything other than granting new rights
and the source of these new rights is the fact that the FTDA grants rights
in gross when no trademark prior to the FTDA was recognized in gross.
Under traditional trademark jurisprudence, the trademark right in
the United States has no existence independent from the "goodwill
appurtenant thereto" its use on or in connection with some good or
service.42 This means that he holder of a trademark must be able to
specifically name the goods or services on which or with which the mark
is used. Failing that, there are no trademark rights.
The FTDA changes this calculus. Under the FTDA, this close
connection to the specific goods or services on which the mark is used is
minimized and, perhaps, even extinguished. Once free of the goodwill
that the mark has come to symbolize, trademark holders are able to treat
the mark as a commodity and buy, sell, and hypothecate the mark freely.
As we shall see below,43 this is why non-famous, non-iconic marks not
technically eligible for the FTDA struggle to make arguments in
litigation that they are famous when they, in fact, are not.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). The italicized portion demonstrates that the
dilution right is one in gross with no connection to the goodwill or commerce represented by the
mark.
38. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,
1039-40 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that "Lexus" does not dilute "Lexis").
39. George Washington was the holder of the first trademark in what became the United
States. Beverly W. Pattishall, Twio Hundred Years of American Trademark Law. 68 TRADtMARK
REP. 121, 121-22 (1978). His mark was "G. Washington" brand flour. Al
40. Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnaturl" Expansion of Trademark Rights. Is a Federal Dilution
Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 460 (1994).
41. 92 CONG. REC. 7524 (1946), Port, supra note 40, at 460.
42. RocER M. MILGRIM & ERic E. BENSEN, 2 MILGRIM ON LICENSING 15-55 (2017) (footnote
omitted).
43. See inlra Part 11I.
2017] 675
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111. DILUTION LITERATURE
The record is replete with consistent literature critical of the
FTDA.4 4 There is a plethora of well-placed and well-reasoned articles
that criticize the FTDA. 45 It is extremely difficult to find any that support
the FTDA. It is safe to say that authors of this literature (mostly
academics) today do not support the FTDA.
The supporters of the FTDA were and remain practicing attorneys
and their surrogate, the International Trademark Association ("INTA"). 4 s
For all the positives that INTA has provided in supporting and
encouraging knowledge and information about brands and brand
management, its irrational support of trademark dilution in light of all of
this contrary literature is peculiar. As INTA remains an organization
formed by, for and with trademark holders in mind, it is not surprising
that they would support a cause of action that seems to expand the scope
of their domain. However, with all of this contrary literature, one
wonders to whom they are listening. Further, the FTDA has, in the end,
done more harm than good for the cause of recognizing and protecting
legitimate trademark rights.
I mean no specific criticism of INTA as it has done my and other
academics' careers great favors. I merely point out an interesting
disconnect. That is, generally speaking, authors of literature on the
FTDA are opposed to the FTDA and trademark holders support it. That
is, there is a great divide in trademark jurisprudence in the United States
44. "'Literature" here is defined as law review articles.
45. See, e.g., Paul J. Heald & Robert Brauneis, The Myth of Buick Aspirin: An Empirical
Stui of Trademark Dilution 1v Product and Trade Names, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2533, 2533. 2546
(201 1) (arguing that "brand sharing"-the act of using someone else's famous mark as corporate
names or trade names- is common in the United States but are almost never used as trademarks on
products and stating that "psychological studies help explain why the harm allegedly caused by
unauthorized sharing (denominated 'dilution' by Congress) is unlikely ever to occur"); see also
Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1227, 1254 (2008). Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense,
108 YALE L.J. 1687. 1698-99 (1999); Long, supra note 18, at 1033-37: Gary Myers, Statutory
Interpretation, Propert Rights. and Boundaries. The Nature and Limits of Protection in Trademark
Dilution. Trade Dress, and Product Configuration Cases, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 241, 278-
81 (2000): Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of UbiquitY in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 731,
732 (2003) ("Courts and scholars have spilled a great deal of ink on the subject of trademark
dilution ... ."); Sandra L. Rierson, The Myth and Reality of Dilution, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
212, 234-48 (2012); David S. Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New
Aillcnnon, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1659, 1681-85 (2004).
46. INTA (formerly known as the United States Trademark Association ("USTA")) puts
much weight behind the claim that dilution started with a law review article by Frank Schechter.
Frank Schechter, The United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report
and Recommnendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 454-
57, 454 i. 132 (1987) (citing Schechter, supra note 14).
[Vol. 46:669
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today. Commentators do not support the FTDA while INTA
(representing trademark holders) remains steadfastly married to it.
4 7
The criticisms of the FTDA are not on the margins or remote. The
attacks are central to the organization of the United States' judicial
system and central to the Lanham Act. These attacks have been well-
reasoned and vigorously argued. Yet, they fall on the deaf ears of INTA,
the practicing bar, and, most importantly, Congress.
I have written several articles pointing out the conceptual problems
with trademark dilution.48 If I were alone, it might be understandable
why I was ignored; however, I am far from alone. In fact, an entire sub-
group or cottage-industry among academics has developed since
1996 which focuses on pointing out the jurisprudential flaws of
trademark dilution.
Since 1996, there have been hundreds of articles written about
trademark dilution. Most of the articles are quite critical of the FTDA
and/or the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 ("TDRA").4 9 Many
articles focus on the likelihood versus the actual harm test addressed in
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.5" and the resulting amendment to
the FTDA.5" Other popular topics include the effect the FTDA has on
parody,52 the inconsistency between the Second and Fourth Circuits in
47. See, e.g., Mark A. Finkelstein & Michelle Stover, Trademark Dilution. Recent US. Case
Law Rejects Requirement hat Marks Must Be "Identical" or "Substantial, Similar ", INTA BULL.,
Sept. 1, 2012, http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/TrademarkDilutionRecentUSCase
LawRejectsRequirementThatMarksMustB e% E2%80%9CIdentical% E2% 80%9 DorE2%80'V%9C
SubstantiallySimilaroE2%80%9D.aspx (describing some INTA efforts at shaping dilution cases).
48. Kenneth L. Port, Judging Dilution in the United States and Japan, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 667, 668-85 (2008); Kenneth L. Port, The Expansion Trajectorvy. Trademark
Jurisprudence in the Modern Age, 92 J. PAT. COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 474. 482-83
(2010) (arguing that trademark dilution is one aspect of the inextricable expansion of trademark
jurisprudence in the United States and inconsistent with the legislative history of the Lanham Act,
the Act itself, and the Constitution); Port, supra note 26, at 602-07 (arguing that the FTDA gives
trademark holders the perverse incentive to engage in trademark bullying). See generally Port, supra
note 6 (arguing that as trademark jurisprudence in the United States expands via concepts
incorporated into the FTDA, the United States approaches a civil law view of the trademark right
which perceives the mark itself as property); Port, supra note 40, reprinted in Kenneth L. Port, The
"Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 85
TRADEMARK REP. 525 (1995) (arguing that a federal statute to proscribe trademark dilution is
unnecessary as there is no cognizable harm in the dilution of famous marks).
49. Pub. L. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006) (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1063, 1064, 1092,
1125, 1127 (2006)).
50. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432-34 (2003), superseded bi statute,
120 Stat. 1730, aff'd, 605 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2003).
51. See. e.g., Monica Hof Wallace, Using the Past to Predict the Future. Refocusing the
Analvsis of a Federal Dilution Claim, 73 U. CtN. L. REV. 945, 974 (2005).
52. Eugene C. Lim, Of Chew Toys and Designer Handbags. A Critical Analvsis of the
"Parodyi Exception Under the U.S. Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 35 CAMPBELL L. REV. 83,
90-99 (2012); Keren Levy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Conflict Between Constitutional and
2017] 677
HOFSTRA LA W RE VIEW
their substantive application of the appropriate test for trademark
dilution,53 and what constitutes a "famous mark" under the FTDA.54 One
article even persuasively argued that dilution doctrine is not consistent
with the First Amendment.5
I am not naYve enough to believe that any practicing attorney would
read or specifically rely on any law review article. For a long time in the
United States, there has been a belief that legal literature has nothing to
teach the practicing bar and, therefore, it largely goes discounted if not
entirely ignored. However, rarely is the disconnect as large as it is with
trademark dilution literature. With commentators telling INTA and the
practicing bar that not only are they on the wrong side of history, but,
also, on the wrong side of a rational and reasonable development of the
very law they practice, it is peculiar that it goes ignored and ignored
vociferously (if that is possible).
INTA not only ignores the academic critiques of dilution, but also
actively and aggressively supports its adoption in other countries other
than the United States.
Most importantly, Congress also ignores this literature.57 As there
are few academics or other authors of the literature who can afford to
lobby Congress, it is easy to see how and why it is dismissed. This
Article is a call to Congress to take this literature into account when
contemplating trademark dilution and, hopefully, repealing it.
IntelhC tal ProperOi , Interes'ts', 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 425,435-47 (2001); Anthony Pearson. Note,
Commercial Trademark Parody. the Federal Tradenark Dilution .4c, and the First Amendment, 32
VAL.. U. L. REV. 973, 1005-22 (1998). Julie Zando-Dennis, Note, Not Playing Around. The Chilling
Power ofthe Federal Trademark Dilution Act o'1995, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN's L.J. 599, 616-19
(2005).
53. Anna K. Wong, Big Business in Thein Belftr,? Congress to Dumb Down Dilution, 6 LOY.
L. & TECt-H. ANN. 43, 52-57 (2006) (discussing the circuit split between the Fourth Circuit in
Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Conihined Shows. Inc. v. Utah Division o" Travel Development
and the Second Circuit in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc. (first citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding
that actual dilution was required), overruled in part by Moseley, 537 U.S. 418; and then citing
Nabisco. Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir 1999) (holding that likelihood of dilution was
the test of dilution))).
54. Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Fame Law.: Requiring Proof of National Fame in Trademark Law,
33 CARDOZo L. REV. 89, 99-122 (2011).
55. See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Six' Milliseconds. Trademark Law and Cognitive Science,
86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 554-58 (2008).
56. Trevor Little, INTA President ExPects 'Evolution Not Revolution' as the Association
Looks to Embrace the Wider Brand Communit', WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (Feb. 6, 2017),
http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/blog/detail.aspx?g-348e0e05-3a3e-40cc-8a 18-
42d337703463.
57. Jane Ann Levich, Ambiguity in Federal Dilution Law Continues: Levi Strauss & Co. v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., Case in Point, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 677, 691-92 (2012).
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If Congress were to read and think about some of this literature, it
would surely give it pause. The literature is direct and openly hostile to
the FTDA. One of the earliest articles warned that dilution protection
poses "an anticompetitive threat to market efficiency and consumer
welfare."58 A student comment prophetically predicted that:
One of the primary motivations for enactment of a federal dilution law
was to provide a single, nationwide solution to the problems of
patchwork protection against the gradual erosion of a mark's
distinctiveness. Because dilution is difficult to pin down and
impossible to measure, the FTDA necessarily suffers from some
vagueness. This in turn makes a uniform, nationwide solution unlikely,
at least until a significant FTDA case reaches the Supreme Court.
59
Of course, that Supreme Court case did arise in Moseley, but
Congress overruled that case with the TDRA.6" At any rate, a uniform,
national standard still eludes us as the appellate courts still apply the
FTDA disparately.61
Perhaps the most prophetic article was written in 1991, well before
the adoption of the FTDA. It claimed that trademark dilution provided
an overly broad scheme that would be counterproductive in the end.
62
Again, a student note sums up the fight against the FTDA rather
succinctly as follows:
Dilution protection is a largely unnecessary and costly safeguard that
can undermine the objectives of trademark law by producing anti-
competitive results. A likelihood of dilution determination is
conceptually difficult to apply and as a result courts rely on it
unnecessarily. In addition, the injury is speculative and difficult
to measure.
63
Rebecca Tushnet makes a central attack on the constitutional
legitimacy of trademark dilution as follows:
Though the cognitive theory of dilution is internally consistent and
appeals to the authority of science, it does not rest on sufficient
empirical evidence to justify its adoption. Moreover, the harms it
identifies do not generally come from commercial competitors but
58. Klieger, supra note 2, at 795.
59. Lori Krafte-Jacobs, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act of1995, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 659, 696 (1998).
60. Wong, supra note 53, at 64-66.
61. Levich, supra note 57, at 692; Wong, supra note 53, 52-57.
62. David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV. 531, 538-46
(1991).
63. William Marroletti, Note, Dilution, Confusion, or Delusion? The Need for a Clear
International Standard to Determine Trademark Dilution, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 659, 692 (1999).
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from free speech about trademarked products. As a result, even a
limited dilution law should be held unconstitutional under current First
Amendment commercial-speech doctrine. In the absence of
constitutional invalidation, the cognitive explanation of dilution is
likely to change the law for the worse. Rather than working like
fingerprint evidence - which ideally produces more evidence about
already-defined crimes - psychological explanations of dilution are
more like economic theories in antitrust, which changed the definition
of actionable restraints of trade. Given the empirical and normative
flaws in the cognitive theory, using it to fill dilution's theoretical
vacuum would be a mistake.
64
There is not even common ground on who is the appropriate fact
finder in a dilution case, a judge or a jury.65 Some see the judiciary being
resistant to application of dilution principles because it grossly expands
trademark rights based on non-traditional trademark rationales.66 Some
have even challenged whether dilution provides a remedy where there is
61no injury. Some have expanded the criticism of the TDRA for
inappropriately extending dilution protection to descriptive marks and
broadening its application to trade dress all in a manner that is
inconsistent with prevailing case law which takes a more restrictive
approach.68 Some have empirically pointed out that borrowing of truly
famous trademarks (the presumed harm in dilution) very rarely actually
happens.69 Or that the requisite showing of fame is obtuse at best.7" Or
even worry about whether dilution protection will lead to an apoplectic
world where everything, the moon, the sun, etc., are owned and in which
exclusive rights are claimed.71
64. Tushnet, supra note 55, at 507.
65. See David S. Welkow itz, Who Should Decide? Judges and Juries in Trademark Dilution
Actions, 63 MERCER L. REV. 429, 452-64 (2012).
66. See. e.g., Joshua G. Jones. The "Inequities" of Dilution. flow the Judiciarl, Mav Use
Principles o/ Equitv to Frustrate the Intent of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 91 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 200, 217 (2009) ("The judiciary at both the state and federal levels have
been extremely resistant to dilution because it radically expands the scope of trademark holder's
rights. Not only does dilution expand these rights but it does so based on none of the traditional
trademark rationales.").
67. See, e.g., Karen Jacobs Louden & Tiffany Fonseca, Does the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act Provicie a Right W'ithout a Renedi ? The Supreme Court's First Fora into Trademark Dilution."
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 7 DEL. L. REv. 31, 33 (2004).
68. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical Fiew of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 11
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 187, 195-98 (2007).
69. See, e.g., Heald & Brauneis, supra note 45, at 2562.
70. See, e.g., Adam Omar Shanti, Comment, Measuring Fame. The Use of Empirical
Evidence in Dilution Actions, 5 MARQ. 1NTELL. PROP, L. REV. 177, 185-89 (2001).
71. See, e.g., Natalie J. McNeal, Note, Trademniark. Victoria 's Dirt ' Little Secret. A Revealing
Look at What the Federal Trademark Dilution Act Is Ti3ving to Conceal, 56 OKLA. L. REv. 977.
1000-02 (2003).
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Perhaps the best defense of trademark dilution appeared in a 2004
article.72 This article argued that the claims that trademark dilution are
somehow mystical and incomprehensible are largely misplaced. Rather
than focusing on defining the verb used (likelihood or actual) to modify
the noun (dilution), we should focus on the fact that a qualitative
weighing (comparing trademarks) has always occurred in trademark
infringement jurisprudence. The test of likelihood of dilution or actual
dilution is less relevant than the idea that this qualitative weighing take
place. Does the junior mark interfere somehow with the senior mark? If
so, the author argues, "[d]ilution should no longer be seen as a mystical
construct, but instead should take its rightful place alongside the
traditional confusion-based theory with which it shares more in common
than has heretofore been acknowledged."73
Professor Barton Beebe also provides a defense of the TDRA by
claiming it is "a sensible and progressive reform of American federal
antidilution protection.74 Professor Beebe, being one of a very few
number of academic commentators who have written positively about
dilution, nevertheless is very careful of his support. He urges courts to
avoid impenetrable words like "dilution" and focus, instead, on two,
distinct causes of action provided for in the TDRA: anti-tarnishment
protection and anti-blurring protection.75 Perceived this way, Professor
Beebe argues, it provides a sustainable model of meaningful protection
for trademark holders.76 However, Beebe is also cognizant of the fact
that the existence of the FTDA gives actors incentives "to find in the
term 'dilution' a receptacle for all imaginable harms to their marks."77
Additionally, others claim to be able to show statistically that
dilution is a real thing.
78
However, it is clear that the vast majority of the hundreds of articles
produced regarding the controversial topic of trademark dilution have
viewed it negatively. These articles are all published and readily
72. See generaild, Thomas R. Lee, Demnyst/.ing Dilution, 84 B.U. L. REV. 859 (2004).
73. Id. at 944.
74. Barton Beebe, A Deli'nse n/the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1144 (2006).
75. Id. at 1156-74.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1174.
78. See. e.g., SUngho Cho, Empirical Substantiation oJ Sport Trademark Dilution" Quasi-
Experimental Evainination of Dilutive Effects, 25 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 27, 40-47 (2015). Julie
Manning Magid et al., Quantifi/ng Brand liage. Empirical Evidence of Trademark Dilution, 43
AM. Bts. L.J. 1, 4, 26-38 (2006) ("[O]utlin[ing] a randomized experiment for proving actual
dilution [and] conclud[ing] that the Court's legitimizing consumers' brand image through trademark
dilution law is an important advancement in trademark protection.").
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available. However, the practicing bar manifested by INTA remains
steadfastly supportive of the dilution cause of action.
IV. CONGRESS'S UNWAVERING SUPPORT FOR THE FTDA
Congressional support of the FTDA has also been replete if not
vociferous. The narrative created around dilution when it was being
originally drafted and then amended was that there was a major
economic harm that was going unaddressed that, if not addressed, would
have major consequences for American corporations, even though those
consequences were never spelled out in any way relying on verifiable
data.79 When the FTDA was being introduced, the House Report
attached to the Bill stated, in part:
Moreover, the recently concluded Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit
Goods ("TRIPS") which was part of the Uruguay Round of the GATT
agreement includes a provision designed to provide dilution protection
to famous marks. Thus, enactment of this bill will be consistent with
the terms of the agreement, as well as the Paris Convention, of which
the U.S. also a member.
80
That is, the House Report contemplates that the FTDA is
'consistent" with TRIPS.
The Senate apparently felt the same way:
Moreover, Mr. President, the GATT agreement includes a provision
designed to provide dilution protection to famous marks. Thus,
enactment of this bill will be consistent with the terms of the
agreement, as well as the Paris Convention, of which the United States
is also a member. Passage of a Federal dilution statute, Mr. President,
would also assist the executive branch in its bilateral and multilateral
negotiations with other countries to secure greater protection for the
famous marks owned by U.S. companies. Foreign countries are
reluctant to change their laws to protect famous U.S. marks if the
United States does not afford special protection for such marks.
81
As a further statement from Senator Leahy makes clear, the United
States considered dilution protection to be a bargaining chip with our
trading partners:
79. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3-4 (1995).
80. Id. at 4. GATT refers to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A- 11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
81. 141 CONG. REC. 38,559 (1995) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
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Mr. President, passage of this bill is part of our effort to improve
intellectual property protection around the world. I hope that it will
serve to improve trademark enforcement domestically and serve as a
model for our trading partners overseas....
We intend for this legislation to strengthen the hand of our
international negotiators from the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative and the Department of Commerce as they press for
bilateral and multilateral agreements to secure greater protection for
the world famous marks of our U.S. companies. Foreign countries
should no longer argue that we do not protect our marks from dilution,
nor seek to excuse their own inaction against practices that are
destructive of the distinctiveness of U.S. marks within their borders.
8 2
With remarkably imprecise language, INTA also supported the
FTDA as if it were an "international norm" as follows:
The enactment of a proposed federal dilution statute would also
harmonize U.S. trademark law with that of other nations and assist our
country's trade negotiators in persuading other countries to protect
famous trademarks owned by U.S. companies .... Other countries,
including some of our major trading partners, recognize the wisdom of
dilution statutes. Canada has protected famous marks from dilution
since 1953. More recently, Japan, Spain, Greece, and Venezuela have
adopted dilution laws.
83
From this representation, one would think that the United States
was grossly trailing other countries' enlightened adoption of dilution
protection in 1996. In 1993, Japan did adopt a statutory revision that has
come to be identified as providing for dilution-like protection, but, in
1996, there were, as of yet, no Japanese cases that applied this statutory
revision in this manner. In addition, the Japanese term for "dilution"
("MR") appears in no statute, including in the so-called dilution statute.
In fact, the Japanese statute merely states as follows: "[T]he act of using
Goods or Other Appellations of another that are identical with, or
similar to, another person's famous Goods or Other Appellations" 4 is
an infringement.
82. Id. at 38,561 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
83. Madrid Protocol Implementation Act and Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Court and Intellectual Prop. of the Judiciary HR., 104th Cong.
82 (1995) (statement of Mary Ann Alford, Vice President & Assistant Gen. Counsel, Intellectual
Prop., Rebook Int'l Ltd., & Exec. Vice President, Int'l Trademark Ass'n).
84. Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Dilution in Japan, 4 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 228, 229
(2006) (translating Fuseikyoso Boshiho [Unfair Competition Prevention Act], Law No. 47 of 1993,
art. 2-1-2 (Japan)).
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It is easy today to see this provision as dilution-like protection, but,
in 1996, there was no real indication that it would or should be
interpreted as such. In fact, as a provision of the Unfair Competition
Prevention Act ("UCPA"), it could easily be applied to far broader acts
of unfair competition other than trademark dilution.8 5 Most importantly,
the Japanese statute is silent on competition. Dilution is said to apply to
situations where there is no competition between the parties.86 That is,
dilution protection is granted specifically when there is no competition
regardless of confusion. As the Japanese statute provides no express
language on the role of competition, it is a stretch to call this dilution-
like protection as this appears in the UCPA.
The Canadian statute has provided dilution-like protection since
1953; however, until 2006 this provision went largely ignored by the
Canadian courts.8" In Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v. Boutiques Cliquot,
Lteed.,8 8 the court did grant an injunction as it found that the defendant's
conduct "is likely to have the effect of depreciating the value of the
goodwill."89 This case arose in 2006. In 1996, it would be rather
disingenuous to represent to Congress that Canada had a dilution-like
statute when it had never been applied in any specific case.
Of course, as Spain and Greece are part of the European Union,
their national laws on trademarks become somewhat confused. However,
the statement in 1995 that Spain protected trademarks from dilution is
simply incorrect. The first Spanish trademark law that protected famous
marks from dilution occurred in 2001,9o Greek trademark dilution
commenced in 1994.91
Therefore, INTA's testimony to Congress in 1995 that Japan,
Canada, Spain, and Greece had enacted trademark dilution laws,
implying that the United States was delayed in adopting such a statute
85. See, e.g., [Osaka Dist. Court,] Jan. 21, 2014 (finding that suit is proper under Article 2-1-2
of the UCPA but that the "DeNA BAYSTARS" (in English) (a professional baseball team) does not
infringe on the DNA Corporation's trademark (DNA in Japanese)).
86. Port, supra note 84, at 233-34.
87. See Mark D. Janis & Peter K. Yu, International and Comparative Aspects of Trademark
Dilution, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 603, 606-07 (2008).
88. (2006), 1 S.C.R. 824 (Can.).
89. Trade-Marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c T-13, § 22(1) (Can.).
90. Trademarks Law (R.C.L. 2001, 17) (Spain).
91. Greece Act Number 2239/1994 adopted a version of the European Union directive on
trademarks. Compare (1994: 2239) [Trademark Law], (Greece), with Council Directive 89/104,
1989 O.J. (L 040) (EC). Article 4 of the Act allows owners of famous marks to block the
registration of similar marks on non-similar goods. See Nicolas K. Dontas, Greece, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A COUNTRY- BY-COUNTRY
REVIEW 190-91 (Angus Phang et al. eds., 2004). It does not provide a positive right upon which one
might sue and enjoin non-competing use. Therefore, to claim that it is in anyway similar to United
States dilution law is misleading at best.
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and was under some international pressure to comply, rather than far out
front, was either a fabrication, a misrepresentation or simply
disingenuousness. At any rate, this testimony that seems to have been
instrumental in getting Congress to pass the FTDA was inaccurate. More
accurate would have been to say that the United States was the leader in
the effort to get other nations to adopt a dilution statute. More accurate
yet would be to say that INTA believed that protecting American famous
marks from a theoretical harm by granting broad trademark rights
beyond what any country had theretofore recognized was somehow the
normative goal.
As will be explicated below, this theoretical harm, also known as
dilution, either never actually occurs92 or occurs so infrequently that
there are nearly no reported cases in the United States. That is, the actual
world leader in this cause of action has led other countries into an abyss
where trademark rights are unlimited, where competition is irrelevant,
and where the objective is to commodify and hypothecate the
trademark.9 3 These goals are inconsistent with the objective of trademark
protection-to prevent one manufacturer from representing itself as the
source of a good or service when it is not.94
The TRIPS Agreement was signed and ratified in 1994.9" The
TRIPS Agreement has become the most important international
agreement on the international harmonization of intellectual property
laws around the world. Whether the FTDA was "consistent" with the
92. Heald & Brauneis, supra note 45, at 2533 ("We conclude by examining the still-
widespread phenomenon of brand sharing and find that recent psychological studies help explain
why the harm allegedly caused by unauthorized sharing (denominated 'dilution' by Congress) is
unlikely ever to occur.").
93. See infia Part VI.
94. Learned Hand referred to this as the "Law of the Prophets," that "one merchant shall not
divert customers from another by representing what he sells as emanating from the second." Yale
Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928); see also Kenneth L. Port, Learned
Hand's Trademark Jurisprudence. Legal Positivism and the Myth of the Prophet, 27 PAC. L.J. 221,
232-33 (1996) (quoting Yale Elec. Corp., 26 F.2d at 973).
95. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
96. See Daniel J. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History and Impact on
Economic Development, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND
PRACTICES tN THE DIGITAL AGE 23, 43 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007); J.H. Reichman & David Lange,
Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement. The Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to
Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Propero , Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11 passim
(1998); J.H. Reichman. The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the
Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441,444-56 (2000); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates
to Partners (Episode II). Protecting Intellectual Propery in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV.
901, 941 fig.2 (2006); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
369. 402 (2006) ("[T]he international intellectual property regime, to some extent, is handicapped
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United States' obligations under the TRIPS Agreement deserves some
thought and analysis as the above representations were made that the
FTDA was consistent with the United States' obligations under the
TRIPS Agreement.
In fact, it is not consistent with TRIPS and it is an odd bargaining
chip. The relevant portion of the TRIPS Agreement reads as follows:
Article 6bis [related to the protection of famous marks] of the Paris
Convention (1967) shall apply, inutatis mutandis, to goods or services
which are not similar to those in respect of which a trademark is
registered, provided that use of that trademark in relation to those
goods or services would indicate a connection between those goods or
services and the owner of the registered trademark and provided that
the interests of the owner of the registered trademark are likely to be
damaged by such use.
9 7
The emphasized language "indicate a connection between" in
Article 16-3 quoted above" is inconsistent with both the FTDA and
courts' application of the doctrine. In this regard, the FTDA states:
Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be
entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time after
the owner's mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or
trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or
dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence
or absence oJ actual or likely confuiision, of competition, or of actual
economic injury.
99
Here, the emphasized portion claims that this cause of action
attaches "regardless" of the "connection" Article 16-3 of the TRIPS
requires. That is, the two are very inconsistent. The Lanham Act dilution
cause of action is much broader than that contemplated under TRIPS.
Under TRIPS, a "connection" must be shown; under the Lanham Act,
the cause of action attaches "regardless" of any connection. Another
word for the "connection" contemplated by the TRIPS Agreement
would, of course, be "confusion as to source," precisely what the FTDA
expressly excludes.
In addition, after the Supreme Court held in Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc. that the correct standard for determining when dilution
by its lack of maximum standards.").
97. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 95, art. 16-3 (last emphasis added).
98. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 43(c)(1), 1125(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
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occurs is "actual dilution,""1 ° Congress in 2006 specifically overruled
the Supreme Court in the TDRA and made the standard the lower
"likelihood of dilution" test.10 The trademark lobby is the only winner
in this scenario.
Following Moseley, most academic commentators concluded that
the Supreme Court got it right. By looking at the poorly drafted FTDA,
the Court found an obvious inconsistency. In one place, the Lanham Act
referenced "causes dilution"'1 2 and in another place the Lanham Act
defines dilution as "the lessening of the capacity"' 3 of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods and serves thereby marked.
In March of 2003, in Moseley, the United States Supreme Court
drew a new line in the sand regarding the FTDA and attempted to finally
curtail the heretofore resplendent Congressional expansion of the law of
trademark dilution. Justice Stevens's opinion had the result of making
trademark dilution causes of action much less attractive.
Victoria's Secret had registered its principal mark on January 20,
1981, for use on lingerie and other women's apparel.0 4 By the time the
litigation commenced, Victoria's Secret had 750 stores nationwide,
distributed 400 million catalogues, and had sent more than 39,000 copies
of its catalogues to Elizabethtown, Kentucky, where the defendant was
located.0 5 In 1998 alone, Victoria's Secret had spent $55 million in
advertising and its gross sales exceeded $1.5 billion."' 6
FIGURE 1:
..___ ~ , .,,
g /frS ECRET
100. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432-34 (2003), superseded by statute,
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1063, 1064, 1092, 1125, 1127 (2006)), off d, 605 F.3d 382 (6th Cir.
2010).
101. Trademark Dilution Revision Act, sec. 2, § 43, 120 Stat. 1730, 1730-32.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000, amended 2012).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000, repealed 2006).
104. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 537 U.S.
418.
105. Moselev, 259 F.3d at 466.
106. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422-23.
20171
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW
That is, there was no question that Victoria's Secret's trademark
was famous.
In 1998, Victor and Cathy Moseley opened a retail store advertising
and selling adult novelty items including lingerie and adult erotica. They
referred to their establishment as "Victor's Secret.10 7 After an army
colonel based at nearby Fort Knox sent Victoria's Secret a copy
of an advertisement showing the Moseleys's usage, Victoria's Secret
immediately demanded the Moseley's cease and desist from further
infringing or diluting Victoria's Secret's trademark."'8 When the
Moseleys simply changed the mark to read "Victor's Little
Secret," Victoria's Secret filed suit claiming, among other things,
trademark infringement and dilution.1"' The Moseleys's final mark
appeared as above.'10
Victoria's Secret's trademark infringement claim was dismissed by
summary judgment at trial and Victoria's Secret did not appeal this
issue.'l However, noting the tarnishing effect that the Moseleys's use
would have on the Victoria's Secret mark, the court held in favor of
Victoria's Secret on their dilution claim and issued an injunction against
the Moseleys, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 
12
The question on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether or not a
plaintiff claiming dilution had to show objective evidence of actual
dilution or whether the standard for dilution was a "likelihood of
dilution.""' 3 There had been a split in the Circuits on this specific issue.
The Fourth,''4 Fifth,' and Seventh"6 Circuits required actual dilution,
while the Second''7 and Sixth"' Circuits had held that a likelihood of
107. Id. at423.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 423-24.
110. See supra fig. 1.
111. See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 467 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 537
U.S. 418. Of course, the last thing Victoria's Secret would want is to claim that the Moseleys were
in competition with Victoria's Secret. the requisite claim to a trademark infringement action. That
is, to claim there was competition with the Moseleys, Victoria's Secret would have to claim that the
hardcore por store competed with its softcore image. As such, they had no interest in appealing the
infringement claim. However, Victoria's Secret has subsequently started a line of products it has
labeled "Victoria's Little Secrets" for fragrances.
112. Mosele, 259 F.3d. at 467-68, 471-77.
113. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 421-22.
114. See Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999).
115. See Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 489 n.9 (5th Cir. 2004).
116. See Sullivan v. CBS Corp.. 385 F.3d 772, 779 (7th Cir. 2004).
117. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 228-29 (2d Cir. 1999).
118. See Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562, 568 (6th Cir. 2000), sunnarTjudginent
granted in part, summnary judgment denied in part, 92 F. Supp. 2d 790 (W.D. Tenn. 2001),
ovierriled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003), superseded /)v statute,
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dilution was sufficient. The Supreme Court granted certiorari with the
express purpose of resolving this split.'"
The Supreme Court held that when the marks at issue are not
identical, actual dilution, as opposed to a likelihood of dilution, was the
correct standard2 ' and implied that surveys may be required in future
cases to establish actual dilution.12' The Court stated that "the mere fact
that consumers mentally associate the junior user's mark with a famous
mark is not sufficient to establish actionable dilution."1
22
It took Congress a few years to act but act they did and definitively
stamped out this interpretation of the Supreme Court.13 In the TDRA of
2006, Congress made the test "the likelihood of dilution" rather than
"actual dilution.' 24
As the data reported below makes clear, after Moselev and before
the TDRA of 2006 (a period of three years), reported dilution cases in
the United States dropped dramatically. There is no doubt that Moselev
had the intended effect: courts should enjoin use of a trademark if there
is some cognizable harm caused by dilutive conduct by a non-
competitor. As actual harn is impossible to show, trademark dilution
claims dropped. 125
In 2003 and 2004, Professor Smith and I (separately) argued for a
"super registry"'126 for marks subject to trademark dilution protection. If
we simply required registrants of claimed famous marks to make a
second showing to the United States Patent and Trademark Office
providing actual evidence of the mark's fame, this notice issue regarding
what marks are protectable under dilution and what marks are not could
be solved. This position has not been popular with trademark attorneys
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1063. 1064, 1092, 1125, 1127 (2006)), lff"d, 605 F.3d 382 (6th
Cir.).
119. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. 535 US. 985, rev 'd and remanded bi 537 U.S. 418
(2)03).
120. The Court held such because the statute authorizes relief ifa junior user "ccauses dilution
of the distinctive quality' of the [senior user's] mark." Moselev, 537 U.S. at 432-33 (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 11 25 (c)( I) (2000, amended 2012)). The statute does not say "likelihood of dilution,"
rather, the statute expressly says "causes dilution." See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). As such, the Court
found it necessary to show some objective evidence of dilution before relief was possible. See
Moselev, 537 U.S. at 432-34.
121. Mosclev, 537 U.S. at 434.
122. Id. at 433.
123. See Wong. supra note 53, at 63-66.
124. See id. at 64-66.
125. See infi-a notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
126. See Lars S. Smith, Inplementing a Registration ivstem fir Famous TrademarkA, 93
TRADEMARK REP. 1097, 1119-42 (2003): see also Kenneth L. Port, The Trademarl, Su)er Register:
,4 Re'sponse to Professor Smth, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 881, 888-90 (2004).
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who make a living making spurious and good faith arguments that every
mark is famous.
Congress passed the TDRA of 2006, overruling the most sensible
trademark dilution judicial case to date. Now, the standard
for determining if dilution has occurred is to look to the "likelihood
of dilution."' 127  Although there is nice symmetry here because it
comports with the standard for trademark infringement of "likelihood of
confusion," it further encourages speculation because it is
unworkably vague. 121
A likelihood of confusion is determined by looking at multiple,
non-exhaustive factors that each circuit court has developed.129 These
tests range from the specific to the broad, but they have been relied on
for a long time to make reasonable estimations of when consumers
presume that a good or service emanates from one entity when, in fact, it
comes from a different entity, the "Law of the Profits" of trademark
jurisprudence, as Learned Hand said.'30 Specific, well-accepted elements
of evidence can be relied upon in court to make out this claim. Surveys
can be conducted. Direct testimony about when consumers are likely to
be confused can be elucidated and articulated. Although, obviously also
subject to the whims of client advocacy, surveys have the appearance of
providing objective evidence of whether confusion is likely. Prospective
in nature, the likelihood of confusion test has been a cornerstone of
trademark jurisprudence for a long time.
It has turned out to be extremely complex and controversial to
develop a reliable survey, adopted by courts, that tests whether a mark is
diluted.'3' After all, how could you ask an unsuspecting survey
127. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730,
1730-32 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1063, 1064, 1092, 1125, 1127 (2006)).
128. Apparently, the TDRA is also vague as some courts still require a showing of actual
dilution. See, e.g., Doctor's Data, Inc. v. Barrett, 170 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1100 (N.D. 111. 2016) ("To
succeed on a trademark dilution claim, 'proof of actual dilution is required, either through survey,
financial, or circumstantial evidence."' (citing Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 779 (7th Cir.
2004))).
129. For a full description of the tests the various circuit courts rely on to determine "likelihood
of confusion," see SHELDON W. HALPERN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF UNITED STATES
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COPYRIGHT, PATENT, AND TRADEMARK 323-27 (5th ed. 2015).
130. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
131. This has not stopped some from proposing some options of which, of course, the authors
are quite confident. See, e.g., Cho, supra note 78, at 40-47; Magid et al., supra note 78, at 4, 26-38
("[O]utlin[ing] a randomized experiment for proving actual dilution [and] conclud[ing] that the
Court's legitimizing consumers' brand image through trademark dilution law is an important
advancement in trademark protection."), see also Todd Anten, In Defense of Trademark Dilution
Surveys. A Post-Moseley Proposal, 39 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 30-43 (2005); William G.
Barber, How to Do a Trademark Dilution Survey (or Perhaps How Not to Do One), 89
TRADEMARK REP. 616, 629-31 (1999); Krista F. Holt & Scot A. Duvall, Chasing Moseley's Ghost:
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respondent if use of a famous mark by a non-related entity contributes to
the winnowing away of the distinctive capacity of the famous mark?
Wouldn't the survey taker need to educate the respondent about years of
non-competing uses'? Somehow, the respondent would, all on its own to
avoid a leading question, have to say, "Wait, now the scales have been
tipped and this use goes too far."
The United States courts had a difficult time accepting that trade
dress claims were nothing more than trademarks for the shape of goods.
If the test for trademark dilution is going to be a likelihood of dilution,
where are the cases that should be filling in what in the world this
means? If it is going to have symmetry with trademark infringement, we
would logically expect courts to come up with specific, multi-factored,
non-exhaustive lists for when a mark is diluted. This provides legitimacy
for the courts. The court, in essence, pushed the analysis through the
multi-factored test and comes up with a reasoned conclusion.
In the United States, the least sustainable judicial decision
is an arbitrary one.1 32 Without a test for dilution, how is it that
all determinations by courts are not simply arbitrary and,
therefore, illegitimate?
Congress waded into this conversation when it mandated that the
test in dilution cases be a "likelihood of dilution."' 3 3 Congress abdicated
its responsibility by not telling us what a "likelihood of dilution" means
or how to test for it. And, of course, it would have if it could have. Given
the nebulous nature of dilution itself, Congress apparently left for courts
to fill in how to answer the ridiculous question of "likelihood of
dilution." When Congress cannot explain when a mark is diluted and
courts either cannot or will not, is it fair to maintain such a law? In
addition, Congress is at complete odds with most academic commentary
regarding dilution law. At best, Congress is not objective.
Presumptively, academics are objective. The objective judgment of a
vast majority of academics is that the dilution law ought to be repealed.
V. DATA ON REPORTED DILUTION CASES
As practitioners increasingly claim both trademark dilution and
trademark infringement in the same case, it is becoming increasingly
Dilution Surveys Under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 98 TRADEMARK RIP. 1311. 1322-44
(2008).
132. See Michael Pappas. Singled Out, 76 MD. L. REv. 122, 141 (2016) ("An arbitrary law is
illegitimate, even if it does not single out an individual, because the power of goverment does not
extend to arbitrary actions.").
133. See Pub. L. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730, 1730-32 (2006) (codified as amended in 15
U.S.C. § 1125 (2006)).
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difficult to collect reliable data on when dilution is the principle cause of
action in any given case. Of course, practitioners are merely attempting
to cover all of their bases and do not want to leave anything out for fear
of appearing incompetent or, worse, being found liable for malpractice if
they forget or exclude a viable cause of action. The problem is that
trademark dilution jurisprudence is so fluid that it has become
impossible for an average practitioner to determine when it applies and
when it does not apply. Therefore, the dilution cause of action is added
to complaints with no regard to whether there is competition and is
most often pled on the same operative facts as the infringement cause
of action.
In reality, if dilution adds anything to the plaintiff s case, it ought to
be pled on separate facts. If the same operative facts are relied upon to
plead a dilution cause of action as an infringement cause of action, it
leaves commentators to wonder what was added with the FTDA. That is,
if a court does not accept the plaintiff's claim to competition between the
parties, the plaintiff can rely on the dilution cause of action regardless of
competition and regardless of confusion.134 That was what the FTDA
was supposed to add to trademark litigation. That practitioners are
relying on the FTDA even when they have established competition and
do not rely on separate operative facts indicates that they remain
confused as to when and why the FTDA ought to apply.
That being the case, it is difficult to parse out the true dilution cases
from the mix of the many cases that are actually infringement cases but
where dilution is also claimed. By reading each case closely, one finds
the following results-of all reported trademark cases'35 between 1996
and 2015, the following number of reported cases included a dilution
claim with a claim for infringement:
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012) ("[T]he owner of a famous mark that is distinctive... shall
be entitled to an injunction against another person who ... commences use of a mark or trade name
in commerce that is likely to cause dilution ... regardless of the presence or absence of actual or
likely conffsion, of'coinpetition, or of actual economic injure." (emphasis added)).
135. The Mitchell Hamline School of Law Trademark Litigations study consists of a list and a
coding of all trademark cases that reached a dispositive result since July of 1947, the effective date
of the Lanham Act. The study is accessible for free with no restrictions. See Trademark Litigation
Search Results, WM. MITCHELL C. L. INTELL. PROP. INST., http://app.mitchellhamline.edu/
Trademark/Hoime/TrdResults?Term-&ddlYear-AI+Years&ddCourt-AlI+Courts&ddlBasis-3&dd
ISpec-1 (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). As Mitchell Hamline School of Law supported this study, if
you use it for any purpose, we only ask that attribution be given. Also, during this reported period,
the total number of reported cases varied greatly but the average was about fifty cases per year. Data
for the years 2012 2015 is on file with the author.
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This appears to be a fair amount of activity for the FTDA in
reported trademark litigation in the United States; however, when the
numbers are corrected for cases that rely exclusively on the FTDA, as








This data supports the conclusion that before the Moseley case,
exclusive dilution cases were frequently reported, but since the Moseley
case, even with the adoption of the TDRA, there are very few dilution
cases that get reported. It may be that dilution does not occur as Paul
Justin Heald and Bob Brauneis asserted138 or that dilution cases are no
longer reported. The one thing that can be said with some certainty is
that the FTDA is not seen as a judicial priority any longer. This, of
course, begs the question of why it has fallen into disrepute or why
judges do not mark dilution cases as "for publication." The answer to
that conundrum is beyond the scope of this Article, but, in the vein of "I
told you so," I suspect the judiciary is uncomfortable with the broad
right granted by the FTDA,139 they do not understand it, 140 or the cases
136. Id.
137. Id. The study conducted at Mitchell Hamline School of Law covers years 1947 2011.
Data for the years 2012 2015 is on file with the author.
138. See Heald & Brauneis, supra note 45, at 2561-62.
139. See Stephen G. Bullock, Proving a Claim Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act-
Are the Courts Diluting the FTDA?, Loy. INTELL. PROP. & HIGH TECH. J., Winter 2000, at 1.4-5.
140. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1030-31
(2d Cir. 1989) (finding that the appropriate population for finding similarity is the reified TV
announcer but the appropriate population to find fame is society at large).
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are not there to report. That is, dilution may be occurring but dilution
cases are no longer being reported.
VI. THE COMMODIFICATION OF TRADEMARKS
A. Famous Marks
When considering trademark dilution in the United States, one must
differentiate between famous trademarks, iconic marks, and not famous
trademarks. The FTDA is responsible for generating this distortion in
trademark jurisprudence. When famous,14 1 the trademark holder may
take advantage of the FTDA. 142 If not, the trademark holder is not
supposed to be able to rely on the FTDA, 143 although advocates often
make claims that any mark is famous. However, the concept of fame
itself appears to be on a nebulous sliding scale where a mark can be
famous and another mark can be really famous or iconic. When iconic,
the distorted trademark jurisprudence becomes even more perverted.
There are no provisions in the Lanham Act that address trademarks
which become iconic.
GOOGLE is a good example of an iconic mark for which the rules
of trademark doctrine change based on the iconic status of the mark. In
Elliot v. Google Inc., 144 the District Court in Arizona seemingly became
star struck by the fame of the GOOGLE mark and, through tortured
reasoning, found the mark GOOGLE not generic, not a verb, and a valid
and enforceable mark, based on very little actual, non-opinion
evidence.'45 I am not making the foolish claim that the GOOGLE mark
141. As defined in the Lanham Act, "a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general
consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the
mark's owner." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012). The Lanham Act goes on to give examples of
evidence to be used to establish fame. Those examples include:
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark,
whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties.
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered
under the mark.
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.
(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of
February 20, 1905, or onl the principal register.
Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i) (iv).
142. Id. § 1125(c)(1).
143. Id. (stating that the cause of action applies to "the owner of a famous mark").
144. 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (D. Ariz. 2014), qal'd, 860 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017). For the
purposes of how doctrine becomes fudged with the fame of the mark, focus is placed on the lower
court opinion.
145. Id. at 175.
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is not iconic, just that the court in Elliot based its conclusion on rather
suspicious reasoning.
Even though the GOOGLE mark is pronounced the same as the
generic word "googol," which means 10 to the 100th power, GOOGLE
has become an iconic search engine on the Internet.146 That is, the
trademark GOOGLE was derived from the generic word, "googol."'4 7 A
simple misspelling of a generic word does not, normally, render it a
distinctive trademark148 as the traditional doctrine in trademark law is
once generic, always generic.149  As the sound, meaning, and
appearance15° of"googol" became "google," it so resembled the generic
word that it would have been difficult to argue that it was distinctive of
that original word. In order to use a generic word arbitrarily and,
therefore, create inherently distinctive trademark rights, the use would
have to be distinctive of that word's original meaning.151 That is,
GOOGLE would need to mean something other than a googol.
In fact, that is hard to imagine as Google Inc. presumptively set out
to create a fast search engine with great capacity. That is, a search
engine with googols of speed and capacity. As such, GOOGLE was
never arbitrary.5 1 It was a suggestive mark.153 It suggested speed and
capacity and the "imagination test"'54 would have been necessary to
146. See Frank Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles. Commercial Ethics for
Carriers and Search Engines, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 263, 263 n.t ("Google is the most dominant
search engine in the U.S .. "); Google's Gag Order: An Internet Giant Threatens Free Speech,
PERRSPECTIVES: BRINGING LIGHT TO DARKNESS (June 20, 2004), http://www.perrspectives.com/
articles/art gagorder01.htm (claiming that Google's iconic status leads to the appropriate use of the
word as a verb and ignoring the trademark significance of this fact, and stating that "Google is on
the verge of becoming the Internet arbiter of the First Amendment").
147. See Christina Sterbenz, Google Could Owe Its Name to a Simple Typo, BUS. INSIDER
(Aug. 8, 2014, 2:45 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-did-google-gets-its-name-2014-8.
148. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
12-138 (4th ed. 2011) ("[A] misspelling of a generic name which does not change the generic
significance to the buyer, is still generic and cannot be a trademark.").
149. See Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1161 (D. Ariz. 2014); TY Inc. v.
Softbelly's, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 531-32 (7th Cir. 2003).
150. The sound, meaning, and appearance of a mark is the generally accepted standard for
determining if two marks are similar.
151. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 8 (2d Cir. 1976)
(discussing a secondary meaning of the word "Safari").
152. An arbitrary mark is a common English word used in such a different manner that it has
nothing to do with the products on which is it used. An example is Apple brand computers. C. id at
9 n.6 ("Ivory' would be generic when used to describe a product made from the tusks of elephants
but arbitrary as applied to soap.").
153. A suggestive mark is one that suggests the quality or attribute of some good or service
rather than be totally distinctive from source. See id at 10-11.
154. See, e.g., Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine. 318 F.3d 900, 905 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003);
Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 943 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002); ANNE GILSON
LALONDE ET AL., 1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS: TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE 2-100.1
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recognize that GOOGLE is a designated source, not simply claiming to
be a fast search engine with large capacity.
Of course, GOOGLE has today become an iconic mark; however,
at its inception Google Inc. merely used a misspelling of a generic word
suggestively. As such, GOOGLE had inherent distinctiveness from the
start.5 5 That is, Google Inc. began its masterful job of using and
applying trademark jurisprudence to its advantage from the very
beginning or manipulating it to serve its interests.
On July 8, 1998 when GOOGLE was in its infancy, Larry Page,
one of the founders of GOOGLE said, "Have fun and keep googling."' 56
This is the type of generic use of the trademark by the claimant himself
that would usually destroy trademark rights as it did for ASPIRIN15' and
CELLOPHANE.158 To determine if the mark has become generic, courts
look to the holder's usage to determine if the holder used it
appropriately.1 59 That is, when there is evidence in the record that the
very claimant of the mark used it as a generic word, courts will likely
find the mark to be generic.60
The English language word "googol" still refers to 10 to the 100th
power, no matter what Google Inc. does with the similar appellation.
That is, there is also an inherent conflict in the law versus Google Inc.
here, as the black letter law rule is that once generic, always generic.6'
In the case of GOOGLE, it is not difficult to imagine, for example, a
time when computer speed reaches a "googol." Every manufacturer of
such a fast computer will have a competitive need 62 to refer to her
(2006).
155. Cf Cadbury Beverages, Inc. v. Cott Corp., 73 F.3d 474, 479 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Unlike a
generic term, which can never be a valid trademark, or a descriptive term, which can be protected
only if it has acquired 'secondary meaning,' a fanciful trademark 'is entitled to the most protection
the Lanham Act can provide."' (first citing McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126,
1131 (2d Cir. 1979); and then quoting Lois Sportswear, U.S.A.. Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d
867, 871 (2d Cir. 1986))).
156. Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1171 (D. Ariz. 2014).
157. See Bayer Co. v. United Ding Co., 272 F. 505, 509-10,513-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
158. See Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75. 80-82 (2d Cir. 1936).
159. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 605-06 (9th
Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 540 U.S. 1099 (2004), vacated and remanded, 543 U.S. I 11 (2004), rev'd
and remanded, 408 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2005); Am. Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207
F. Supp. 9, 15-20, 25-28 (D. Conn. 1962), ojf'd sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin
Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963), vacated, 418 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1969), modified, No. 7230,
1970 WL 197166 (D. Conn. Dec. 30, 1970).
160. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc., 408 F.3d at 605-06. Am. Thermos Prods. Co., 207 F.
Supp. at 15-20, 25-28.
161. See Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 374 (1 st Cir. 1980) ("[N]o amount
of purported proof that a generic term has acquired a secondary meaning associating it with a
particular producer can transform that term into a registrable trademark.").
162. See A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 304-06 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing CES
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computer as one that works at a "googol pace," or some such reference.
This such reference, although currently a nominative fair use under
trademark doctrine,' may be perceived as dilutive conduct by Google
Inc. in the future and they may attempt to foreclose such use.
However, the court in Elliot never mentioned the generic word
"googol." In a case challenging the trademark GOOGLE for being
generic, it seems disingenuous to never mention the generic word
"googol." After all, once googol was generic, it is supposed to always be
generic, or so the black letter law doctrine informs us.'64 If two marks
sound, mean, or appear the same, trademark doctrine would consider
them the same.'65 Therefore, the mere misspelling of GOOGLE from
googol is irrelevant to this analysis.
In Elliot, the court analyzed the phrase "go google it" and attempted
to determine if use of "google" as a verb was generic simply because it
was used as a verb as Elliot claimed.'6 6 The court came to the conclusion
that "go google it" can be both an indiscriminate verb usage and a
discriminate verb usage.67 Indiscriminate verb use, the court stated, is
where the purchaser does not care from where the good or service
emanates.168 Discriminate use amounts to the use of a trademark
as a verb but the consumer still cares from where the goods or
services emanate. 
69
The court appropriately stated that he statutory standard is for it to
determine the "primary significance" of the mark.' If the mark
primarily indicates the product, the mark is generic; if the mark
primarily indicates the producer, it is a valid trademark.' Purchaser
motivation is expressly not the test of genericism under the Lanham
Act. 2 The courts are not to look at why someone bought the good or
Publ'g Corp. v. St. Regis Publ'ns, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 15 (2d Cir. 1975)).
163. See Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 903-05 (9th Cir. 2003): Playboy
Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 806 (9th Cir. 2002) ("For the same reason uses in comparative
advertising are excepted from anti-dilution law, we conclude that nominative uses are also excepted.
A nominative use, by definition, refers to the trademark holder's product. It does not create an
improper association in consumers' minds between a new product and the trademark holder's
mark,"), aff'd, 30 Fed. App'x. 734 (9th Cir. 2002).
164. But see Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28
CARDOZO L. REv. 1789, 1830-33 (2007) (arguing that the "once generic, always generic" principle
has done trademark doctrine and the economy a disservice).
165. See Henri's Food Prods. Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 354-56 (7th Cir. 1983).
166. Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1165, 1173-75 (D. Ariz. 2014).
167. Id. at 1161-62, 1165, 1175.
168. Seeid. at 1162.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 1163 (quoting Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 138 (1938)).
171. Id. at 1161 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012)).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).
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service, they are supposed to look to see what the primary significance
of the mark was to them when confronted with the mark. A consumer
only needs to know that the mark identifies a consistent source.7 The
consumer does not need to know or "care" what the source is.
The court's two-step dance around discriminate and indiscriminate
verb usage is merely another way of inquiring and relying upon
customer motivation.
Factors to be considered when determining if a trademark is generic
include the "(1) competitors' use of the mark, (2) plaintiff's use of the
mark, (3) dictionary definitions, (4) media usage, (5) testimony of
persons in the trade, and (6) consumer surveys."17 4 However, because
the court viewed this test through the lens of discriminate/indiscriminate
verb usage, its conclusions apply to purchaser motivation, not the
primary significance of the mark. There is a long line of cases75 and an
express amendment'7 6 to the Lanham Act that dismiss purchaser
motivation as a relevant element when a court analyzes a mark for
genericism. As it is not likely that the court in Elliot was unaware of this
case law and amendment to the Lanham Act, it begs the question of what
motivated the court to find the legal realism77 result of appearing to
know the outcome (GOOGLE is not generic) and then fashioning the
outcome to match that expectation.
The evidence relied upon by the court in Elliot was not the most
compelling. Regarding the element of dictionary definitions, the court
did find in favor of Elliot by concluding that in dictionaries, even if they
are heavily influenced by Google Inc., "the word google carries meaning
as an indiscriminate verb."'78 In other words, the court in Elliot found
the dictionary definitions to lend itself to a finding that the GOOGLE
mark was generic.
In doing so, the court relied on current dictionary references, which
have largely been influenced by Google Inc.7 9 As such, these references
are not reliable. The court points out that all cited dictionary references
173. Klieger, supra note 2, at 790 ("Where, as is often the case today, consumers do not know
or even care to know the exact origin of goods or services bearing a particular trademark,
trademarks serve as markers of consistent source and quality.").
174. Am. Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 64 F. Supp. 2d 549, 563-64 (E.D. Va. 1999), qfdin
part, vacated in part, 243 F.3d 812 (4th Cir. 2001). The court in Elliot appropriately considered
these factors. See Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1170-73.
175. See, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1324-26 (9th
Cir. 1982).
176. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, sec. 115, § 114, 102 Stat.
3935, 3940-41 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
177. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 42-47 (1930).
178. Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1171.
179. Id.
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include a reference of google as the name of a search engine."
Regarding Elliot's claims that Google Inc. influenced the dictionary
entries, the court gratuitously called such claims "scurrilous attacks
unsupported by admissible evidence."' Google Inc.'s enforcement
efforts in this regard are quite well-known in the industry."2 This
conduct by Google Inc. is so pervasive that a court might even take
judicial notice of it happening and not require admissible evidence, it is
odd for the court to go so far as to label such obvious conduct as a
"scurrilous attack."' 183 After all, the dictionary meaning of "scurrilous" is
"making or spreading scandalous claims about someone with the
intention of damaging their reputation."'84 To call Elliot's assertion that
Google Inc. is obviously influencing the dictionary definition of
"google" "scurrilous" is to demonstrate the court's bias in Google Inc.'s
favor. That is, GOOGLE is too big to fail.
However, regarding the claimant's use of the mark, the court was
apparently confused or misled. This element should be focused on how
the claimant itself used the mark.185 The point, of course, is that it would
be unreasonable to sustain a trademark if the holder of the mark itself
failed to use the mark as a mark. The court skipped this important detail
and jumped to whether the non-enforcement of a mark renders it
generic.86 Of course, if unreasonably lacking in enforcement,187 a court
might find the mark generic;"' however, that does not mean the holder's
use of the mark should be ignored as the court did. There is good
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1171 n.9.
182. See DAVID A. VISL & MARK MALSEED, THE GOOGLE STORY: FOR GOOGLE'S 10TH
BIRTHDAY 220-27 (updated ed. 2008).
183. See Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3dat 1171 n.9.
184. Scurrilous, ENG. OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/scurrilous (last updated Jan. 1, 2017).
185. See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ'ns Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1150-51
(9th Cir. 1999); Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1013 n.5
(9th Cir. 1979) ("If the plaintiffs used the mark from the very beginning in a way that the public
connected the term with the service rather than with the server, then they have contributed to the
genericness of the term.").
186. Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1171.
187. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 496-98 (2d Cir. 1961). Note
that the concept of "policing a mark" stems from dicta in Polaroid. Polaroid requires only that
trademark holders be reasonable in policing their marks. It does not require them to stamp out (by
filing a law suit) every single use of every single potentially infringing use.
188. See Am. Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 823 (4th Cir. 2001) ('"You Have
Mail' has been and continues to be used by AOL and by others to alert online subscribers that there
is electronic e-mail in their electronic mailboxes, and no more. This functional use of words within
the heartland of their ordinary meaning cannot give rise to a trademark for the e-mail service when
it is no more than the announcement of the arrival of a message.").
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evidence in the record"9 that might lead a court to conclude that the
mark was used generically by the holder and, as such, a court might be
justified in finding GOOGLE to be generic. The court merely skipped
this analysis.
Regarding the media usage of the mark GOOGLE, the court made
an odd presumption that the media never refers to an Internet "search
engine as a 'google,"' and, therefore, the media usage does not indicate
the mark has become generic.90 This statement, however, is inconsistent
with the evidence presented to the court. For a court that is obsessed
with finding discriminate or indiscriminate verb usage of the mark and
presumes that the answer to this question will lead it to the promise land
of a determination of genericism, the court now shifts to thinking about
the mark as a noun, with absolutely no indication that it has done so. For
this element for this court, the mark GOOGLE would be found generic if
it had become the noun for Internet search engines. As this is a new twist
to this case, there appears to be no effort made by Elliot to determine if it
is now a noun or not. This is a further indication that the court's focus on
grammar can only show purchaser motivation, not the primary
significance of the mark.
In what may have appeared to be a mundane case to the court about
a remarkably famous trademark versus a cybersquatter, much more is
actually at stake. Because the court seemed to be overly impressed with
the fame of the GOOGLE mark or because Elliot relied nearly
exclusively on the argument that using a mark as a verb always renders
the mark generic, the court got sloppy. The court appeared convinced
that the distinction between discriminate and indiscriminate verb usage
was a distinction with a difference when analyzing when a trademark
has become or was generic. Again, this false distinction created the
impression for the court that one (discriminate) verb use acted like
trademark use and the other (indiscriminate) use did not. This false
distinction masks the actual role of the court in such an analysis. The
actual role of the court is to determine the primary significance of the
mark, not the purpose behind the use of the mark as a verb or, its
equivalent, purchaser motivation. And, maybe more telling, is the fact
that the court seems to have ignored GOOGLE as a noun. If a trademark
becomes any part of speech, its primary significance is arguably
no longer to act as a mark but, instead, to act as a generic English
language word.
189. Larry Page, one of the founders of GOOGLE said, "Have fun and keep googling." Elliot,
45 F. Supp. 3dat 1171.
190. Id. at 1172-73.
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This masking becomes possible when GOOGLE is iconic. When
famous and iconic, the court seems to have put its responsibility aside
and, in true legal realism terms, knew what result it needed to arrive at
and arrived at that result. GOOGLE was famous and iconic, not generic
and invalid.
The point of this analysis is not to attempt to show that GOOGLE is
generic or that the court came to the normatively wrong conclusion. The
point of this analysis is to demonstrate how the fame of the GOOGLE
mark misdirected the court's analysis. The fame of the mark, in fact,
overshadowed the analysis. That is, fame continues to cause problems
for United States' trademark jurisprudence. This is the very same fame
that it codified in the FTDA. Naturally, there are stronger trademarks
and weaker trademarks; however, when the fame of the mark becomes
the driving purpose of the mark, not the mark's capacity to identify
source, we forget the actual purpose of trademark jurisprudence. The
source indicating function of the trademark has always been paramount.
When fame takes over, the mark becomes a commodity and fame
becomes the goal as, when famous, the rules change. When famous (and
iconic), the rules change as was made apparent in Elliot.
If, for the sake of argument, we do not accept the court's perverted
analysis regarding the discriminate/indiscriminate verb usage, Elliot
does seem to have some cognizable interests or, at least, some very good
arguments to be made. The first is that GOOGLE is derived from the
word "googol," a generic word. Any analysis has to overcome this fact.
It can be overcome by Google Inc. demonstrating that GOOGLE was
inherently distinctive as a suggestive mark and, in addition, has acquired
a remarkable amount of secondary meaning; however, the further black
letter law of genericism is that no amount of secondary meaning will
save a mark from genericisim.19' Likewise, no matter how inherently
distinctive the mark is from the outset, generic use by the proponent of
the mark would usually result in a finding of genericism. 9 2 Google Inc.
seems to be guilty all along of generic use of GOOGLE. This may be
another place where the iconic nature of the mark trumps historical
doctrine or, at least, works to mask it and mislead the court.
191. See Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com Inc., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1397, 1409 (W.D. Wash. 2002)
("[N]o degree of secondary meaning will save a generic mark.").
192. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963),
vacated, 418 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1969), modi/ied, No. 7230, 1970 WL 197166 (D. Conn. Dec. 30,
1970); Pilates, Inc. ,. Current Concepts, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 286, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("A
plaintiffs own generic use of its marks supports a finding of genericness, as does generic use by
plaintiffs claimed predecessors.").
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The record is replete with examples of companies using trademarks
inappropriately and then losing trademark rights to a finding of
genericism or successfully wrestling the trademark back from the brink
of a genericism finding.1 93 That is, it is the use of the trademark that is
usually analyzed in a trademark genericism challenge as it is always the
significance to the consuming public that should be the focus of the
analysis, not some trumped up redefinition of the dual roles that verbs
might play in the English language just to save an iconic mark from a
finding of genericism.
Of course, it is difficult to imagine the GOOGLE mark as generic.
Google Inc. has, of course, invested much time, money, and energy in
succeeding to create an iconic brand. It is hard to imagine a court
coming to the conclusion that GOOGLE was generic. The point here is
not necessarily to argue that GOOGLE is generic but only that the court
in Elliot failed to do its job in analyzing the primary significance of the
mark, got caught up in the fame of the mark, and came to the conclusion
that purchaser motivation in the discriminate use of the verb "go google
it" was the appropriate analysis. That is, the court's "discriminate verb
usage" is nothing different than purchaser motivation. When dealing
with a famous, iconic mark like GOOGLE, it is demonstratively quite
easy for the court to be led astray in its analysis. The court had an
outcome it desired to reach and it reached that outcome. Although the
court appropriately stated that the primary significance of the mark was
the test to determine genericism, it utterly failed in any attempt to
actually apply that test.
The court in Elliot'94 did actually attempt to sort through the
various types of other evidence that might educate it about the primary
significance of the mark by looking at "dictionary usage; mark-holder
usage; competitor usage; media usage; and consumer surveys.' '
Many other such iconic trademarks in the United States have this
type of star power; however, if not famous, the generic use of the mark
as a verb usually destroys trademark significance when it is done by the
trademark claimant or by purchasers.'96 It seems that, again, it is the
mere fame of the mark which dictates a different analysis. Once famous,
193. See List o/ Generic and Genericized Trademarks, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.orgi
wiki/List of generic and genericized trademarks (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
194. Although trademark dilution was claimed in Elliot, the court focused on the claim of
genericism, as the motion before it was to cancel the trademark GOOGLE, and so it did not reach a
determination of the dilution claim. See Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1160, 1175.
195. Id. at 1170-73.
196. But see Microsoft Wants You to 'Verb Up' and 'Bing It', GAWKER (May 29, 2009, 12:36
AM), http://gawker.com/5272444/microsoft-wants-you-to-verb-up-and-bing-it (arguing that more
iconic marks are intentionally being used as verbs).
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trademarks get treated differently in the United States. This might be
good and appropriate; however, nowhere in the Lanham Act other than
the FTDA does it state that famous marks should be treated differently
than non-famous marks. The FTDA leads courts to a trifurcation of the
concept of fame: (1) non-famous marks; (2) famous marks; and (3)
iconic marks. Iconic marks operate like a magnet to lead courts astray of
standard trademark jurisprudence.
This jurisprudence has been perverted by the FTDA. Attempting to
make a mark famous or iconic acts to commodify the mark so that
holders pursue the hypothecation value of a so-called famous mark
rather than the remarkable ability of such marks to identify source.
B. Non-Famous Marks
The commodification of iconic trademarks in the United States too
often affects non-famous marks as well. Holders of non-famous and
non-iconic trademarks desire to move their trademarks from this "non"
status to a more powerful position a position of fame. In order to
accomplish this objective, trademarks in the "non" category are treated
by their holders as if they were famous.197 As the concept of fame is so
nebulous under United States law, creative attorneys make creative
arguments to accomplish this task. These creative attorneys are
encouraged to make creative arguments in the zealous representation of
their clients' (what they perceive as) best interest. That is, even weak
and descriptive marks are often times claimed to be famous by creative
trademark counsel. 1 98
There is no downside to this type of speculation.1 99 Through
aggressive litigation tactics where trademark holders claim their marks
were subject to dilution from non-competing entities, as these non-
competing entities acquiesced to these sometimes spurious claims, the
scope of the claimed trademark grows. At some also nebulous point,
these non-famous trademarks become subject to claims that they have
become famous and all non-competitive use can be enjoined pursuant to
the FTDA.2"° This is the gold-standard in trademark discourse. Savvy
197. See ii/Pia notes 200-09 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 200-09 and accompanying text.
199. In 5.5% of all reported trademark cases over the last decade, the defendant prevailed on its
motion for summary judgment, a significantly higher percentage than in all litigation. Port, sup ra
note 22, at 225-27, 231-32. However, in those cases where the defendant prevailed in its motion for
summary judgment, Rule 11 sanctions were never found against the non-moving plaintiff. Id. at
232: see FED. R. Cv. . 11. That is, plaintiffs are free to claim whatever they want, whether a
reasonable claim or unreasonable under Rule 11 jurisprudence and never suffer any consequences.
200. 15 U.S.C. § I125(c)(1) (2012).
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trademark holders work to make the mark famous and then, using the
FTDA, shut down all non-competing uses. To the extent non-competing
uses are eliminated, the hypothecated value of the trademark increases,
which only further fuels speculation in the trademark.
Trademark counsel are free to claim any mark is famous and
diluted.2"" There is no check to this conduct. Third-party users, non-
competitors, and anyone interested in the use of the same or similar
mark on unrelated goods and services, are often left in a difficult
situation. They have no notice that someone might be making the
(sometimes spurious) claim that the non-famous trademark was diluted.
Trademark counsel can only search available databases and make
gallant, if subjective, suppositions about whether a listed registered
trademark has reached the requisite level of fame to trigger the FTDA.
For better or worse, the issue of fame is left to the persuasive powers of
each trademark attorney arguing each trademark matter.
All current incentives in United States trademark law are to claim a
mark is famous as early as possible and, sometimes as cited above, in
rather dubious circumstances. The commodification of the mark occurs
when the motivation for protecting a mark switches from protecting the
mark's source identification function to seeing the trademark as a
financial asset where preventing all non-competing uses for a famous or
non-famous mark furthers the hypothecation value of the trademark. To
201. See, e.g.. Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. %. TGC Stores. Inc., 939 F. Supp. 340, 343. 350
(D.N.J. 1996) (holding that "We'll Take Good Care of You" is not famous, despite attorney's claim
to the contrary). The court got part of this analysis right and raises the question of what counsel was
thinking of to make the claim:
[T]his Court finds that plaintiffs mark is not famous and unworthy of protection under
the new federal law. The slogan has only been used by plaintiff for nine years. Also
plaintiff only uses the slogan in association with the store name Genovese. Therefore, in
and of itself, the slogan is not inherently distinctive. Defendant is not employing
plaintiff's mark by using the words "take good care." Moreover, as discussed above, the
parties are not in direct competition. Hence, the Court finds that plaintiff is unlikely to
succeed on the merits of its dilution claims.
Id. (citations omitted). Of course, if the parties are not in direct competition, this case is most
appropriately a dilution case, not exempted from dilution as the court seems to think See, e.g.,
ArcSoft, Inc. v. Cyberlink Corp., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ("Giv en the high
burden that a plaintiff faces in establishing that its mark is sufficiently famous to support a dilution
claim, ArcSoft must plead more than conclusory assertions of fame to survive a motion to dismiss:
it must plead facts that support a plausible inference that its [Perfect365] mark qualified as a
household name by February 2014 (or whatever date is alleged as defendants' first use of the
Infringing Marks). Because Arcsoft has not done so, the motion to dismiss the fourth and sixth
causes of action for trademark dilution is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND."); New World
Sols., Inc. v. NameMedia Inc., 150 F. Supp. 3d 287, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ("Because there is no
genuine dispute of material fact, then, that the Mark was not famous for purposes of the federal
dilution claim when NameMedia registered the Domain Name, Defendant's Summary Judgment
Motion on this claim is granted."); Kuklachev v. Gelfman, 600 F. Supp. 2d 437, 472 (E.D.N.Y.
2009) ("Furtheroore, there is no evidence to indicate that the 'Moscow Cats Theatre' mark is 'truly
famous.' The motion to dismiss Claim IV of the complaint is granted.").
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be sure, there are many instances where trademarks reach some requisite
level of "fame" (such as GOOGLE) regardless of how fame is defined
and applied. However, most trademarks are not objectively famous.
Most trademarks are just trademarks with no iconic value. When counsel
for even these non-famous, non-iconic trademarks claim that the
trademark is famous, even non-famous marks are being used as a
commodity, not as a source identifier.
Non-famous trademarks are not without a remedy for infringement.
Non-famous trademarks can, and always do, rely on section 32 of the
Lanham Act20 2 to claim the trademark was infringed by a competitor
using the same or similar mark on the same or similar goods.2 3 As
stated above, trademark dilution and trademark infringement are two
mutually exclusive concepts.0 4 Although this, too, has been perverted
by zealous advocates for trademark holders where simply every
conceivable cause of action is just tossed into a complaint without
sufficient consideration, the original intent of the FTDA was to provide a
cause of action where an alleged "gap '' 2°5 in existing protection. If
trademark dilution is coterminous with trademark infringement, after all,
dilution provides nothing that infringement does not and, therefore, has
become irrelevant.
Plaintiffs no longer feel confident enough of an exclusively dilution
cause of action even if that is the true harm it is recognizing. Rather,
dilution only comes up today as an add-on cause of action to an
infringement claim.2t At best, again through the appropriate and zealous
advocacy of trademark litigators, the bright line that used to exist
between dilution and infringement has become blurred to the point
of non-recognition.
Non-famous marks, therefore, are claimed to be famous for
sometimes spurious reasons to increase the perceived value of the
trademark. Trademark holders are encouraged to engage in this
speculation because the broader use is acquiesced to, the more the
trademark is worth in hypothecation, and the more reward it recognizes
202. Lanham (Trademark) Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, 437-38, § 32 (1946) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1946)).
203. See, e.g., Soloflex Inc. v. Nordictrack Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1721, 1728-30 (D. Or. 1994).
204. See supra Parts IV V.
205. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
206. See LALONDE ET AL., supra note 10, at 5-A7 to -A8 ("[W]here there is a clear case of
infringement on competing soft drinks or computers, a fortiori the distinctiveness of the famous
mark would be diluted. Accordingly, one would expect to see violations of both sections of the Act
pleaded in a complaint asserting rights in even an arguably famous trademark. Cases where there
would be dilution only, and no infringement, are few and far between. These might involve famous
trademarks for industrial products sold to sophisticated consumers .... ").
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from this speculation. Moving a trademark from a weak mark to a
famous mark has many rewards. Not only can the holder of a weak mark
that potentially becomes famous due to the acquiescence of others and,
thereby, is enforced in an increasingly broader scope, but also the
underlying value of the mark increases. That is, the basic objective of
holders of non-famous marks is to increase the hypothecation value
of the underlying mark, not to protect the mark's source
identifying function.
This increase in hypothecation value becomes possible when the
speculation in a mark's fame happens. This speculation is fueled by the
bifurcated values attached to famous and non-famous marks. Quite
naturally, famous marks are and should be granted broader enforcement
rights when legitimately infringed. This has always been the trademark
doctrine in the United States.2" 7 However, quite unnaturally, when non-
famous marks are claimed to be famous just to speculate and increase
the hypothecation value of the mark rather than identify source,
trademarks are being used as a commodity and bought, sold, and traded
irrespective of the "goodwill appurtenant thereto.' '2°t It is the goodwill
appurtenant thereto to which trademark jurisprudence applies.
Trademark speculation of non-famous marks is a new addition to
trademark claimants' motivations.
VII. CONCLUSION
The FTDA and related TDRA should be repealed. Each has
encouraged a new fori of trademark speculation that used to be referred
to as "trademark extortion" or "trademark bullying." This new form of
trademark speculation converts the trademark itself into a commodity,
which can be bought, sold, and invested in devoid of the goodwill with
which it is used. Trademark rights in the United States must be used on
or in association with some good or service. There are no trademark
rights in gross. The FTDA creates these trademark rights in gross and
that allows the trademark to be perceived by its holders as a commodity.
Worse yet, holders of non-famous trademarks, trademarks that should
207. See Rierson, supra note 45, at 305 ("If dilution law is forced to justify its own existence
on traditional trademark (i.e., economic) grounds, it almost certainly is a loser. The benefits gained
by dilution enforcement, which are slim at best, are outweighed by the attendant costs, including
those that are occasioned by the inevitable overreaching that it enables. If the holder of a famous
trademark is injured by another's use of its mark, trademark infringement law, particularly in the
breadth of its modern application, should be more than adequate to prevent real economic injury.
Even in trademark infringement cases, the famous trademark holder can obtain injunctive relief
without proving anything beyond a likelihood of confusion; harm is presumed.").
208. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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not be taking advantage of the FTDA, become incentivized to become
labeled "famous" and take advantage of the FTDA just to expand the
scope of the trademarks and, in the process, convert even non-famous,
non-iconic, regular trademarks into assets or commodities which can be
hypothecated devoid of the source identifying function that the courts
and the Lanham Act envisioned.
When trademarks become commodities, we lose focus on the point
of trademark law. In the end, trademark law is a consumer protection
statute in the United States. It is intended to prevent consumers from
being deceived as to the source or origin of a good or service. When we
treat trademarks as commodities, we lose sight of the original purpose of
trademark law. Trademark law stops being a consumer protection statute
that is needed to keep transaction costs as low as possible so that
purchasers pay the least possible for their goods or services, to a law by,
for and with, trademark holders. For any healthy trademark system, there
needs to be a balance between the trademark holder, consumers, and
third parties. We need the trademark holder to invest in trademarks to
reduce search costs; we need consumers to trust the system and make
accurate purchases where they get what they wanted; we need third
parties to be protected so that they will enter the market and we will
have a healthy competitive economic environment.
When we commodify trademarks, the trademark holder wins
this fight. We only look to the interests of the trademark holder
and forget the needs of the consumer and the needs of third parties.
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